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Summary. This paper considers an exchange economy with a measure space of
agents and consumption externalities, which take into account two possible external
effects on consumers’ preferences: dependence upon prices and dependence upon
other agents’ consumption. We ﬁrst consider a model with a general externality
mapping and we then treat the particular case of reference coalition externalities,
in which the preferences of each agent a are inﬂuenced by prices and by the global
or the mean consumption of the agents in ﬁnitely many (exogenously given) ref-
erence coalitions associated with agent a. Our paper provides existence results
of equilibria in both models when consumers have transitive preferences. It ex-
tends in exchange economies the standard results byAumann [2], Schmeidler [16],
Hildenbrand [12], and previous results by Greenberg et al. [11] for price dependent
preferences, Schmeidler [17] for ﬁxed reference coalitions and Noguchi [15] for
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1 Introduction
This paper considers an exchange economy with a measure space of agents and
consumption externalities, which take into account two possible external effects
on consumers’ preferences: dependence upon prices and dependence upon other
agents’ consumptions.
The price dependence externality is a long recognized problem, which recently
found new applications in the study of ﬁnancial markets, where a two-period tem-
porary equilibrium model has a reduced form as a Walrasian model with price
dependent preferences. For the existence of equilibria in economies with a measure
space of agents and price externalities we refer to Greenberg et al. [11], who use
ordered preferences and use a game-theoretical approach, which exploits Debreu’s
original idea of introducing a price-setting player.
The dependence upon other agents’ consumptions has also been considered in
recent years, with attempts to have the same level of generality for a measure space
of agents as for the case of ﬁnitely many agents. In this paper, we will consider
agents with transitive strict preferences which are not necessarily complete as in
Schmeidler [16]. The question arises if one can drop transitivity and completeness
simultaneously but our approach does not cover this case, forwhichwe refer toKhan
and Vohra [14] and Yannelis [18]. Our treatment of the existence problem differs
from [14] and [18] in considering a weaker convexity assumption on preferences
that allows us to encompass the results of Aumann [2], Greenberg et al. [11] and
Schmeidler [17]; indeed the way they model externalities does not allow for a
convexifying effect on aggregation, even if the measure space is nonatomic.
We ﬁrst present the model with a general externality mapping. The preference
relation of each agent a, which may depend upon the externality e in a given exter-
nality space E, is denoted by ≺a,e and the inﬂuence of the externality on agents’
preferences is represented by a given (exogenous) externality mappingΦ, which as-
sociates to each agent a, each price p and each (integrable) consumption allocation
f , the externality e = Φ(a, p, f) ∈ E. Thus, given the price p and the allocation
f the choices of agent a will be made with the preference relation ≺a,Φ(a,p,f).
Our model considers “ﬁnitely many externality effects”; that is, formally, the exter-
nality space E is assumed to be a subset of a ﬁnite dimensional Euclidean space.
This makes an explicit restriction on the couples (p, f) of prices and (integrable)
consumption allocation that can inﬂuence agents’ preferences via the externality
mapping Φ.
The previous model allows us to consider the particular case of reference coali-
tions externalities, in which the preferences of each agent a are inﬂuenced by
prices and by the global or the mean consumption of the agents in ﬁnitely many
(exogenously given) reference coalitions associated with agent a. Let (A,A, ν) be
the measure space of consumers, and for each agent a ∈ A and each price p, let
Ck(a, p) ∈ A (k = 1, . . . ,K) be ﬁnitely many (exogenously given) reference
coalitions. Each coalition Ck(a, p) ∈ A can be considered as the reference class
of agent a for a particular group of commodities, say clothes, music, housing or
travel. The externality dependence operates via reference consumption vectors (for
the particular group of commodities) which can be obtained either as the global
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or as the mean consumption of agents in the reference coalition of agent a. With
a single reference coalition (i.e., K = 1), the externality mappings Φ1 and Φ2
corresponding to the global and the mean consumption are deﬁned, respectively,
by:
Φ1(a, p, f) =
∫
C(a,p)
f(α)dν(α);
Φ2(a, p, f) :=


1
ν[C(a, p)]
∫
C(a,p)
f(α)dν(α) if ν[C(a, p)] > 0,
0 if ν[C(a, p)] = 0.
Bothmodels consider ﬁnitelymany external effects, with externality spaceE=IRH+ ,
the closed positive orthant of the commodity space IRH , denoting byH the number
of commodities in the economy. The ﬁrst case can be illustrated by network effects,
i.e., the number of persons connected to a network (internet or mobile phone) and
the global consumption in the reference coalition may be important for some agent
to decide to connect herself. In the second model, only the mean consumption is
used to deﬁne the “reference trend”.
The aim of this paper is to provide an existence result of equilibria in the
model with a general externality mapping and then to deduce from it an existence
result in the reference coalitions model both for global and mean dependence. In an
exchange economy,we extend the classical results byAumann [2], Schmeidler [16],
Hildenbrand [12], and previous results by Greenberg et al. [11], for price dependent
preferences. In the reference coalition model, our result encompasses the result by
Schmeidler [17] in the case of constant reference coalitions (i.e., when the coalition
does not depend on agent a and the price system).We also generalize the existence
result by Noguchi [15] who considers, for each agent a, a particular reference
coalition, which consists of all the agents who belong to a certain income range
associated with agent a (see Sect. 3.3). Finally, we mention the existence results
obtained independently by Balder [4], which also generalizes those of [2,11] and
[17], without being directly comparable with ours since the externality dependence
is deﬁned in a different way and agents have ordered preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model with a
general externality mapping and the associated concept of equilibrium [Sect. 2.1]
and we state the main existence results. Our ﬁrst existence result is stated under a
strong convexity assumption on preferences [Sect. 2.2]. We then weaken this con-
vexity assumption [Sect. 2.3] so that we can encompass the Aumann-Schmeidler-
Hildenbrand existence result in exchange economies. In Section 3, we present the
reference coalitions model [Sect. 3.1], and we deduce from our main result the exis-
tence of equilibria in thismodel [Sect. 3.2]. Finally, we present the particular case of
a reference coalitions model considered by Noguchi [15] and deduce his existence
result. In Section 4 we give the proof of our main existence result [Theorem 2] .We
ﬁrst prove an existence result [Theorem 4] under the additional assumption that the
consumption set correspondences are integrably bounded [Sect. 4.1]. We then de-
duce the main result in the general case from it [Sect. 4.2]. Finally, in theAppendix
we present the main properties of the individual quasi-demand correspondence that
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are used in the proof of the existence theorem, along with some properties of the
Noguchi’s reference coalition and a counterexample due to Balder [4].
2 The model and the existence result
2.1 The model and the equilibrium notion
We consider an exchange economy with a ﬁnite set H of commodities. The com-
modity space1 is represented by the vector space IRH .
The set of consumers is deﬁned by a measure space (A,A, ν), where A is a
σ-algebra of subsets inA and ν is a measure on A. An elementC ∈ A is a possible
group of consumers, also called a coalition. Each consumer a is endowed with
a consumption set X(a) ⊂ IRH , an initial endowment ω(a) ∈ IRH and a strict
preference relation ≺a,e on X(a), which allows for dependence on externalities
e ∈ E (called the externality space), in a way which will be speciﬁed hereafter.
The set X(a) represents the possible consumptions of consumer a. A consumption
allocation of the economy speciﬁes the possible consumption of each consumer,
and is formally a selection of the correspondence a → X(a), which is assumed to
be integrable. The set of consumption allocations is denoted by LX . We assume
also that the initial endowment mapping ω : A → IRH is integrable and thus the
total initial endowment of the economy is
∫
A
ω(a)dν(a).
Speciﬁc to this economy is the fact that price externalities and consumption
externalities can inﬂuence the preference relation of each agent a. Thus, given the
price p ∈ IRH and the allocation f ∈ LX , the choices of agent a will be made with
the strict preference relation ≺a,Φ(a,p,f), where Φ : A× IRH ×LX → E is a given
mapping, called the externality mapping.
In the presence of externalities, the exchange economy is completely sum-
marized by the couple (E , Φ), where the externality space E and the externality
mappingΦ are deﬁned as above and E speciﬁes the characteristics of the consumers
E = {IRH , E, (A,A, ν), (X(a), (≺a,e)e∈E , ω(a))a∈A}.
We now give the deﬁnition of an equilibrium in this economy.
Deﬁnition 1 An equilibrium of the economy (E , Φ) is an element (f∗, p∗) ∈ LX ×
IRH such that p∗ = 0 and
(a) [Preference Maximization] for a.e. a ∈ A, f∗(a) is a maximal element for
≺a,e∗a in the budget set B(a, p∗) := {x ∈ X(a) | p∗ · x ≤ p∗ · ω(a)}, where
1 For a ﬁnite set H we denote by IRH the set of all mappings from H to IR. An element x of
IRH will be denoted by (xh)h∈H or simply by (xh) when no confusion is possible. For two elements
x = (xh), x′ = (x′h) in IR
H
, we denote byx·x′ =∑h∈H xhx′h the scalar product, by‖x‖ = √x · x
the Euclidean norm and by B(x0, r) = {x ∈ IRH | ‖x − x0‖ ≤ r} the closed ball. For X ⊂ IRH ,
we denote by intX , X and coX , respectively, the interior, the closure and the convex hull of X . The
notations: x ≤ x′, x < x′, x << x′ mean, respectively, that for all h ∈ H , xh ≤ x′h, [x ≤ x′ and
x = x′], and xh < x′h; we let IRH+ := {x ∈ IRH | 0 ≤ x} and IRH++ := {x ∈ IRH | 0 << x}. We
also let 1 := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ IRH and the canonical basis {ei | i ∈ H} of IRH be deﬁned by eih = 1, if
h = i and eih = 0, if h = i.
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e∗a := Φ(a, p∗, f∗), that is, f∗(a) ∈ B(a, p∗) and there is no x ∈ B(a, p∗) such
that f∗(a) ≺a,e∗a x;(b) [Market Clearing] ∫
A
f∗(a)dν(a) =
∫
A
ω(a)dν(a).
2.2 A ﬁrst existence result for general externality mappings
We present the list of assumptions that the economy (E , Φ) will be required to
satisfy. Let (A,A, ν) be a measure space, we recall that a measurable set A¯ ∈
A is an atom if ν(A¯) > 0 and for every C ∈ A such that C ⊂ A¯, one has
[ν(C) = 0 or ν(A¯ \ C) = 0] and we denote by Ana the nonatomic part of A;
that is, the complementary in A of the union of all the atoms of A. We denote
by L1(A, IRH) the space of equivalence classes of integrable mappings from A to
IRH and we let ‖f‖1 :=
∫
A
‖f(a)‖dν(a), which deﬁnes a norm on L1(A, IRH).
The space L1(A, IRH) will be endowed with two different topologies, the norm
topology deﬁned by the norm ‖f‖1 and the weak topology σ(L1, L∞); we recall
that a sequence {fn} converges weakly to f if and only if supn ‖fn‖1 < ∞ and∫
C
fn(a)dν(a) → ∫
C
f(a)dν(a), for every C ∈ A (see Dunford and Schwartz
[8], p. 291).
Assumption A The measure space (A,A, ν) is positive, ﬁnite, complete and
L1(A, IRH) is separable for the norm topology;
Assumption C For a.e. a ∈ A, every (e, x) ∈ E × X(a):
(i) E is a closed subset of IRN and X(a) is a closed, convex subset of IRH+ ;
(ii)[Irreﬂexivity and transitivity] ≺a,e is irreﬂexive2 and transitive3;
(iii)[Convexity of preferences on atoms] if a ∈ A \ Ana the set {x′ ∈ X(a) |
not[x′ ≺a,e x]} is convex;
(iv)[Continuity] the sets:
{x′ ∈ X(a) | x ≺a,e x′} and {(x′, e′) ∈ X(a) × E | x′ ≺a,e′ x}
are open, respectively, in X(a) and in X(a) × E (for their relative topologies);
(v)[Measurability] the consumption set correspondence a′ → X(a′) and the pref-
erence correspondence (a′, e′) →≺a′,e′ are measurable4;
(vi) ω ∈ LX , i.e., ω : A → IRH is integrable and ω(a′) ∈ X(a′) for a.e. a′ ∈ A;
Assumption M (i)[Monotonicity] For a.e. a ∈ A, X(a) := IRH+ and
for every e ∈ E and every x, x′ in X(a), x < x′ implies x ≺a,e x′;
(ii)[Strong survival] ∫
A
ω(α)dν(α) >> 0.
The above assumptions are standard and need no special comments. In a model
without externalities (say E = {0}), they coincide with Aumann-Schmeidler’s
assumptions, as discussed in the next section.
2 That is, for every x ∈ X(a), not[x ≺a,e x].
3 That is, for every x, x′, x′′ ∈ X(a), x ≺a,e x′ and x′ ≺a,e x′′ imply x ≺a,e x′′.
4 We recall that a correspondence F , from a measurable space (A,A) to IRn, is said to be
A−measurable, or simplymeasurable, if its graph is a measurable set, i.e.,GF := {(a, x) ∈ A×IRH |
x ∈ F (a)} belongs to A ⊗ B(IRn), where B(IRn) denotes the σ−algebra of Borel subsets of IRn
and A ⊗ B(IRn) denotes the σ−algebra product. The preference correspondence (a, e) →≺a,e is
said to be measurable if the correspondence (a, e) → {(x, x′) ∈ X(a) × X(a) | x ≺a,e x′} is
A ⊗ B(E)−measurable.
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The next assumptions concern the externality side. Hereafter, we suppose that
for every (a, p) ∈ A × IRH , Φ(a, p, f) = Φ(a, p, g) if f = g almost everywhere
on A. Without any risk of confusion, this allows us to consider Φ as a mapping
Φ : A × IRH × LX → E, where
LX := {f ∈ L1(A, IRH) | f(a) ∈ X(a) a.e. a ∈ A}.
Assumption E [Caratheodory](i) E is a closed subset of IRN ;
(ii) for all (p, f) ∈ IRH+ × LX , the mapping a → Φ(a, p, f) is measurable;
(iii) for a.e. a ∈ A, for every sequence {pn} ⊂ IRH+ converging to p and every
integrably bounded5 sequence {fn} ⊂ LX converging weakly to f , the sequence
{Φ(a, pn, fn)} converges to Φ(a, p, f);
AssumptionEB [Boundedness] For all bounded sequence {(pn, fn)} ⊂ IRH+ ×LX
and for a.e. a ∈ A, the sequence {Φ(a, pn, fn)} is bounded in E.
Assumption EC0 [Convexity of preferences on the nonatomic part] For a.e. a ∈
Ana and every (e, x) ∈ E ×X(a), the set {x′ ∈ X(a) | not[x′ ≺a,e x]} is convex.
The above Caratheodory assumption is a standard regularity assumption. The
boundedness assumption EB will be satisﬁed, in particular, in the reference coali-
tions model presented hereafter. We also point out that EB is satisﬁed when the
correspondence a → X(a) is integrably bounded (see Assumption IB hereafter)
and C and E hold.
The last assumption additionally assumes the convexity of preferences on the
nonatomic part of A (whereas in C it was only assumed on the atomic part). This
assumption will be discussed and weakened in Section 2.3.
We can now state our ﬁrst existence result.
Theorem 1 The exchange economy with externalities (E ,Φ) admits an equilibrium
(f∗, p∗) with p∗ >> 0, if it satisﬁes Assumptions A, C, M, E, EB and EC0.
Theorem 1 is a direct consequence of a more general result [Theorem 2] that
will be stated in the following section, which is devoted to the weakening of the
convexity assumption EC0.
2.3 Weakening the convexity assumption EC0
Since Aumann [2], most of the existence results in models without externalities
do not assume convexity of preferences on the nonatomic part Ana of the measure
space of consumers (i.e.,AssumptionEC0). To be able to coverAumann’s existence
result, we will now weaken the convexity assumption EC0. This will allow us to
encompass the known existence results in the three following important cases.
E1: No externalities [Aumann [2], Schmeidler [16], Hildenbrand [13]] E1 = {0}
and the mapping Φ1 : A × IRH+ × LX → E1 is deﬁned by Φ1(a, p, f) = 0.
5 That is, there is some integrable function ρ : A → IR+, such that supn ‖fn(a)‖ ≤ ρ(a) for a.e.
a ∈ A.
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E2: Price dependent preferences [Greenberg et al. [11]] E2 = IRH+ and the
mapping Φ2 : A × IRH+ × LX → E2 is deﬁned by Φ2(a, p, f) = p.
E3: Constant reference coalitions [Schmeidler [17]] E3 = (IRH+ )K and the
mapping Φ3 : A × IRH+ × LX → E3 is deﬁned by
Φ3(a, p, f) :=
(∫
C1
f(a)dν(a), . . . ,
∫
CK
f(a)dν(a)
)
,
where the setsCk (k = 1, . . . ,K) are nonempty measurable subsets ofAna, which
are pairwise disjoint, i.e., Cj ∩ Ck = ∅ for every j = k.
In the three above cases, the externality mappings Φi (i = 1, 2, 3) are “convex”
on Ana in the sense of the following deﬁnition (see Proposition 1 below):
Deﬁnition 2 We say that the externality mapping Φ : A × IRH+ × LX → E is
“convex” on the measurable set C ⊂ A if for every p ∈ IRH+ , for every {fi}i∈I ⊂
LX (I ﬁnite) and every f ∈ LX such that
for a.e. α ∈ C, f(α) ∈ co{fi(α) | i ∈ I},
there exists f∗ ∈ LX such that:
for a.e. α ∈ C, f∗(α) ∈ {fi(α) | i ∈ I},
for a.e. α ∈ A \ C, f∗(α) = f(α),
for a.e. a ∈ A,Φ(a, p, f) = Φ(a, p, f∗) and ∫
A
f(α)dν(α) =
∫
A
f∗(α)dν(α).
We now can state our main existence result, which extends Theorem 1 and
allows us to cover the three above cases E1, E2, E3. For this, we need to introduce
a new Convexity Assumption EC , which is clearly satisﬁed in the two important
cases: (i) convexity of the preferences onAna (i.e.,AssumptionEC0 ofTheorem 1),
and (ii) “convexity” of Φ on Ana.
Theorem 2 The exchange economy with externalities (E ,Φ) admits an equilibrium
(f∗, p∗) with p∗ >> 0, if it satisﬁes Assumptions A, C, M, E, EB, together with
the following one:
Assumption EC There exists a measurable set C ⊂ Ana such that:
(i) for a.e. a ∈ Ana \ C, the preferences are convex, that is, for every (e, x) ∈
E × X(a), the set {x′ ∈ X(a) | not[x′ ≺a,e x]} is convex, and
(ii) the externality mapping Φ is “convex” on C.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section 4 and relies on an intermediary result
(Theorem4) inwhich themonotonicity assumptionM is replaced by the assumption
that the consumption correspondence a → X(a) is integrably bounded (which is
clearly stronger than EB holds). In this case, it is worth pointing out that without
Assumption EC, the corresponding existence result (Theorem 4) may not hold as
shown in the Appendix with a counterexample due to Balder [4].
We end this section by showing that the three above externality mappings Φi
(i = 1, 2, 3) satisfyAssumptionEC, and also a strongerAssumptionEC1 (in which
no convexity assumption on preferences is made).
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Proposition 1 (a) In the three above cases E1, E2, E3, the externality mappings
Φ = Φi (i = 1, 2, 3) satisfy the following assumption:
EC1 There exists a measurable setC ⊂ Ana such that: (i) the externality mapping
Φ only depends on f|C , in the sense that, Φ(a, p, f) = Φ(a, p, g), if f|C = g|C , and
(ii) the externality mapping Φ is “convex” on C.
(b) If Assumption EC1 holds, then Φ is “convex” on Ana, hence Assumption EC
holds.
Proof.
(a) Assumption EC1 is satisﬁed for C = Ana for the cases E1 and E2 and for
C = ∪Kk=1Ck for E3. This is a consequence of Lyapunov’s theorem, applied to
Ana in the ﬁrst two cases and applied successively to each Ck (k = 1, . . . ,K) in
the latter case.
(b) We show that the externality mapping Φ is “convex” on Ana. Indeed, for every
p ∈ IRH+ , let {fi}i∈I ⊂ LX (I ﬁnite) and f ∈ LX such that, for a.e. α ∈ Ana,
f(α) ∈ co{fi(α) | i ∈ I}. Since Φ is “convex” onC ⊂ Ana (by EC1), there exists
an integrablemappingf ′ : A → IRH such that, for a.e.α ∈ C,f ′(α) ∈ {fi(α) | i ∈
I}, for a.e. a ∈ A, Φ(a, p, f) = Φ(a, p, f ′) and ∫
C
f(α)dν(α) =
∫
C
f ′(α)dν(α).
From above, for a.e. α ∈ Ana \ C, f(α) ∈ co{fi(α) | i ∈ I}, hence, from
Lyapunov’s theorem, there exists an integrable mapping f ′′ : Ana \C → IRH such
that f ′′(α) ∈ {fi(α) | i ∈ I} and
∫
Ana\C f(α)dν(α) =
∫
Ana\C f
′′
(α)dν(α). We
consider now the mapping f∗ : A → IRH deﬁned by f∗(α) = f ′(α) for every
α ∈ C, f∗(α) = f ′′(α) for every α ∈ Ana \ C and f∗(α) = f(α) for every
α ∈ A \ Ana and we note that, for a.e. α ∈ Ana, f∗(α) ∈ {fi(α) | i ∈ I} and
for a.e. α ∈ A \ Ana, f∗(α) = f(α). Moreover, from above, for a.e. a ∈ A,
Φ(a, p, f) = Φ(a, p, f ′) = Φ(a, p, f∗) (since f ′|C = f∗|C) and
∫
A
f(α)dν(α) =∫
A
f∗(α)dν(α). unionsq
3 The reference coalitions model
3.1 The model and the existence result
The general model of an exchange economy with externalities (E , Φ) allows us
to consider the reference coalitions model that we now present as an extension of
Schmeidler’s model.
We suppose that, given a price p ∈ IRH+ , each agent a has ﬁnitelymany reference
coalitions of agents, Ck(a, p) ∈ A (k = 1 . . .K), whose consumption choices
inﬂuence the preferences of agent a in a way deﬁned precisely hereafter. Hence,
the reference coalitions may depend upon the agent and also on the price that
prevails; this differs from Schmeidler’s model, in which the reference coalitions
are constant. We will assume that each agent a is inﬂuenced either by the global
consumption or by the mean consumption of agents in the coalition Ck(a, p).
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The “global dependence” case is characterized by the externality space E :=
(IRH+ )K and the externality mapping ΦC1 : A × IRH+ × LX → E deﬁned by
ΦC1 (a, p, f) =
(∫
C1(a,p)
f(α)dν(α), . . . ,
∫
CK(a,p)
f(α)dν(α)
)
.
The “mean dependence” case, is characterized by the externality space E :=
(IRH+ )K and the externality mapping ΦC2 : A × IRH+ × LX → E, deﬁned by
ΦC2 (a, p, f) = (Φ
C
21(a, p, f), . . . , Φ
C
2K(a, p, f)),
ΦC2k(a, p, f) :=


1
ν[Ck(a, p)]
∫
Ck(a,p)
f(α)dν(α) if ν[Ck(a, p)] > 0
0 if ν[Ck(a, p)] = 0.
The reference coalitions model can thus be summarized by the exchange
economies with externalities (E , ΦC1 ) and (E , ΦC2 ), where
E = {IRH , (IRH+ )K , (A,A, ν), (X(a), (≺a,e)e∈(IRH+ )K , ω(a))a∈A},
C := (C1(a, p), . . . , CK(a, p))(a,p)∈A×IRH+ ,
and the externality mappings ΦC1 and ΦC2 are deﬁned as above (and correspond,
respectively, to the global and the mean dependence).
Before stating the existence result, we recall the following notations; for C1,
C2 in A, we let C1∆C2 := (C1 \ C2) ∪ (C2 \ C1) and we let the characteristic
function χC1 : A → IR be deﬁned by χC1(a) = 1 if a ∈ C1 and χC1(a) = 0 if
a ∈ C1.
Theorem 3 The exchange economy with reference coalitions externalities (E , C)
admits an equilibrium (p∗1, f∗1 ) with p∗1 >> 0 for global dependence and an equi-
librium (p∗2, f∗2 ) with p∗2 >> 0 for mean dependence (i.e., (E , ΦCi ) admits an
equilibrium (p∗i , f∗i ) (i = 1, 2)), if it satisﬁes Assumptions A, C, M, EC0, together
with:
Assumption R [Reference Coalition Side]
For every k = 1, . . . ,K for a.e. a ∈ A and every p ∈ IRH+ :
(i) ν[Ck(a, p)] > 0; (ii) for every λ > 0, Ck(a, λp) = Ck(a, p);
(iii) for every sequence pn → p in IRH+ , ν[Ck(a, pn)∆Ck(a, p)] → 0;
(iv) the set {(a′, a′′) ∈ A × A | a′′ ∈ Ck(a′, p)} ∈ A ⊗ A.
The proof of Theorem 3 is given in Section 3.2.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 3
It is a consequence of Theorem 1 and we only have to prove that the externality
mappings ΦCi (i = 1, 2) satisfy Assumptions E and EB. This will be done in the
following three steps, noticing ﬁrst that [E(i)] is satisﬁed.
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Step 1 [E(ii)]: For every (p, f) ∈ IRH+ × LX , the mapping a → ΦCi (a, p, f)
(i = 1, 2) is measurable on A.
Proof. Let (p, f) ∈ IRH+ × LX . We ﬁrst show that the mapping
a → ΦC1 (a, p, f) :=
∫
C(a,p)
f(α)dν(α)
is measurable. We notice that the mappings (a, α) → f(α) and (a, α) →
χC(a,p)(α) are both measurable on A × A (endowed with the product σ−alge-
bra A⊗A), from the fact that f ∈ L1(A, IRH+ ) andAssumption R(iv) respectively.
Hence, the mapping (a, α) → χC(a,p)(α)f(α) is measurable on A × A.
Since χC(a,p)(α)f(α) ≤ f(α) for a.e. (a, α) ∈ A × A and f ∈ L1(A, IRH+ ),
applying the measurability part of Fubini’s theorem, the mapping
a →
∫
A
χC(a,p)(α)f(α)dν(α) =
∫
C(a,p)
f(α)dν(α)
is correctly deﬁned and is measurable on A. Hence, the mapping ΦC1 satisﬁes As-
sumption E(ii).
We now show that the mapping
ΦC2 (a, p, f) :=


1
ν[C(a, p)]
ΦC1 (a, p, f) if ν[Ck(a, p)] > 0
0 if ν[Ck(a, p)] = 0
is measurable on A. Using the above argument for f = 1, we deduce that the
mapping a → ν[C(a, p)] is measurable on A. Since ν[C(a, p)] > 0 for a.e. a ∈ A
(by R(i)), in view of the measurability property of ΦC1 , the mapping ΦC2 satisﬁes
Assumption E(ii). unionsq
Step 2 [E(iii)]: For a.e. a ∈ A and for every sequence {pn} converging to p in
IRH+ and every integrably bounded sequence {fn} converging weakly to f in LX ,
the sequence {ΦCi (a, pn, fn)} converges to ΦCi (a, p, f) (i = 1, 2).
Proof. Let {(pn, fn)} as above. We ﬁrst prove that ΦC1 satisﬁes [E(iii)], i.e., for
a.e. a ∈ A
ΦC1 (a, p
n, fn) =
∫
C(a,pn)
fn(α)dν(α) →
∫
C(a,p)
f(α)dν(α) = ΦC1 (a, p, f).
For this, one notices that∥∥∥∥∥
∫
C(a,pn)
fn(α)dν(α) −
∫
C(a,p)
f(α)dν(α)
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤∥∥∥∥∥
∫
C(a,pn)
fn(α)dν(α)−
∫
C(a,p)
fn(α)dν(α)
∥∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥∥
∫
C(a,p)
[fn(α)−f(α)]dν(α)
∥∥∥∥∥ .
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For the second term, since {fn} converges weakly to f , one has∥∥∥∥∥
∫
C(a,p)
[fn(α) − f(α)]dν(α)
∥∥∥∥∥→ 0.
For the ﬁrst term we have∥∥∥∥
∫
A
χC(a,pn)(α)fn(α)dν(α) −
∫
A
χC(a,p)(α)fn(α)dν(α)
∥∥∥∥ ≤∫
A
|χC(a,pn)(α) − χC(a,p)(α)|‖fn(α)‖dν(α) ≤∫
A
|χC(a,pn)(α) − χC(a,p)(α)|ρ(α)dν(α) =
∫
C(a,pn)∆C(a,p)
ρ(α)dν(α),
recalling that the sequence {fn} is integrably bounded, hence, for some integrably
function ρ : A → IR+, one has supn ‖fn(a)‖ ≤ ρ(a) for a.e. a ∈ A. Moreover,
for a.e. a ∈ A, ν[C(a, pn)∆C(a, p)] → 0 when pn → p (by R(iii)), hence∫
C(a,pn)∆C(a,p)
ρ(α)dν(α) → 0,
since the mapping C → ∫
C
ρ(α)dν(α), from A to IR+, is a positive measure,
absolutely continuous with respect to ν. This implies that the ﬁrst term converges
to zero6 and ends the proof that ΦC1 satisﬁes [E(iii)].
We now prove that ΦC2 satisﬁes [E(iii)]. Since, for a.e. a ∈ A, ΦC1 (a, pn, fn) →
ΦC1 (a, p, f) and ν[C(a, p)] > 0 (by R(i)), it sufﬁces to show that ν[C(a, pn)] →
ν[C(a, p)]. Indeed, one has
|ν[C(a, pn)] − ν[C(a, p)]| =
∣∣∣∣
∫
A
χC(a,pn)(α)dν(α) −
∫
A
χC(a,p)(α)dν(α)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
A
|χC(a,pn)(α) − χC(a,p)(α)|dν(α) = ν[C(a, pn)∆C(a, p)],
which converges to zero (by R(iii)) when pn → p. unionsq
Step 3 [EB]: If {(pn, fn)} ⊂ IRH+ × LX is a (norm-)bounded sequence, then for
a.e. a ∈ A the sequence {ΦCi (a, pn, fn)} (i = 1, 2) is bounded in (IRH+ )K .
Proof. Let {(pn, fn)} as above. For a.e. a ∈ A and for every n, one has
0 ≤ ΦC1 (a, pn, fn) =
∫
C(a,pn)
fn(α)dν(α) ≤
∫
A
fn(α)dν(α).
6 Note:We don’t need to use the fact that the sequence {fn} is integrably bounded. Indeed, if {fn}
converges weakly to f and ν[C(a, pn)∆C(a, p)] → 0, one has directly
∫
C(a,pn)∆C(a,p)
fn(α)dν(α) → 0.
For details, see Dunford and Schwartz [8] p. 294. Thanks to E. Balder for this remark.
408 B. Cornet and M. Topuzu
Since {fn} is norm-bounded and fn ≥ 0, we deduce that for some m ≥ 0
sup
n
‖ΦC1 (a, pn, fn)‖ ≤ m.
Wenowprove thatΦC2 (a, pn, fn) is bounded. Indeed, from above, for a.e. a ∈ A
and every n, we get
∥∥ΦC2 (a, pn, fn)∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥ 1ν[C(a, pn)]ΦC1 (a, pn, fn)
∥∥∥∥ ≤ m 1ν[C(a, pn)] ,
since ν[C(a, pn)] > 0 for a.e. a ∈ A. Recalling now that the sequence {pn} is
bounded and that in the previous step we have proved that, for a.e. a ∈ A, the
mapping p → 1ν[C(a,p)] is continuous on IRH+ , we get that, for a.e. a ∈ A, there
exists m′a > 0 such that 1ν[C(a,pn)] ≤ m′a for every n. It sufﬁces to take for a.e.
a ∈ A
ma :=
1
min{p∈{pn}|ν[C(a,p)]>0} ν[C(a, p)]
.
Hence, for a.e. a ∈ A, supn ‖ΦC2 (a, pn, fn)‖ ≤ m′a.m. unionsq
3.3 Noguchi’s reference coalitions model
We now present Noguchi’s model (see [15]) and we deduce his existence result
from Theorem 3. It can be described by a reference coalition model, with a unique
reference coalition CN (a, p), deﬁned, for each consumer a at price system p, by
CN (a, p) := {α ∈ A | p · ω(α) ∈ I(ω(a), δ(a), p)},
where δ : A → IRH+ is a ﬁxed function and I(ω(a), δ(a), p) is a subset of IR.
Quoting Noguchi [15], “intuitively speaking, I(ω(a), δ(a), p) represents (for agent
a) an income range in the income-scale, relative to income p · ω(a) and with
magnitude p · δ(a)” and among the examples given, we point out the following one
deﬁned by the interval I(ω(a), δ(a), p) = (p · ω(a) + p · δ(a),∞).
We now state the existence result.
Corollary 1 [Noguchi]The economy (E , ΦCN2 ) admits an equilibrium, if it satisﬁes
Assumptions A, C, M, EC0 together with:
Assumption N For every (a,w, d, p, t) ∈ A × (IRH+ )3 × IR+:
(i) I(w, d, p) is an open subset of (0,∞);
(ii) ν[CN (a, p)] > 07; (iii) the function δ : A → IRH+ is measurable;
(iv) for every λ > 0, I(w, d, λp) = λI(w, d, p);
(v) for every sequence {(pn, tn)} ⊂ IRH+ × IR, (pn, tn) → (p, t), if t ∈ I(w, d, p),
then tn ∈ I(w, d, pn) for n large enough;
7 In fact, Noguchi [15] only assumed that ν[C(a, p)] > 0 for every (a, p) ∈ A × IRH+ such that
p · ω(a) > 0. To be able to get Noguchi’s existence result in the more general case, we need to weaken
AssumptionR of Theorem 3 and, also,AssumptionsE andEB of Theorem 2 as in the working paper [7].
Equilibria for economies with externalities 409
(vi) for every sequence {(pn, tn)} ⊂ IRH+ × IR, (pn, tn) → (p, t), tn ∈ I(w, d, pn)
implies t ∈ I(w, d, p);
(vii) for every sequence {(wn, dn)} ⊂ IRH+ × IRH+ , (wn, dn) → (w, d), if t ∈
I(w, d, p), then t ∈ I(wn, dn, p) for n large enough;
(viii) for every sequence (wn, dn) → (w, d) in IRH+ × IRH+ , t ∈ I(wn, dn, p) implies
t ∈ I(w, d, p);
(ix) the set I(w, d, p) \ I(w, d, p) is countable and
c ∈ I(ω(a), δ(a), p) \ I(ω(a), δ(a), p) implies ν[{a ∈ A | p · ω(a) = c}] = 0.
Proof. We deﬁne the reference coalitions C := (C(a, p))(a,p)∈A×IRH+ by
C(a, p) := {α ∈ A | p · ω(α) ∈ I(ω(a), δ(a), p)}.
FromAssumption N(ix), for every (a, p) ∈ A × IRH+ , we get
CN (a, p) ⊂ C(a, p) and ν(C(a, p) \ CN (a, p)) = 0,
hence,
∫
CN (a,p)
f(α)dν(α) =
∫
C(a,p) f(α)dν(α) for every f ∈ LX .
Consequently, every equilibrium of (E , ΦC2 ) is an equilibrium for (E , ΦCN2 ). We
now obtain the existence of equilibria of (E , ΦC2 ) from Theorem 3 (K = 1) and it
sufﬁces to prove that the reference coalitionsC, deﬁned above, satisfyAssumptionR
of Theorem 3. This is proved in Section 5.2 of the Appendix.
4 Proof of the existence theorem
4.1 Proof of Theorem 2 in the integrably bounded case
In this section, we provide an intermediary existence result, also of interest for
itself, under the following additional assumption:
IB [Integrably Bounded] The correspondence a → X(a), from A to IRH+ ,
is integrably bounded, that is, for some integrable function ρ : A → IR+,
supx∈X(a) ‖x‖ ≤ ρ(a) for a.e. a ∈ A.
Theorem 4 Under Assumptions A, C, E, EC and IB, the economy (E , Φ) admits
a free-disposal quasi-equilibrium (f∗, p∗) ∈ LX × IRH with p∗ > 0, in the sense
that:
(a) [PreferenceMaximization] for a.e. a ∈ A, f∗(a) ∈ B(a, p∗) and for a.e. a ∈ A
such that p∗ · ω(a) > inf p∗ · X(a), f∗(a) is a maximal element for ≺a,e∗a in
the budget set B(a, p∗) where e∗a := Φ(a, p∗, f∗);
(b) [Market Clearing] ∫
A
f∗(a)dν(a) ≤ ∫
A
ω(a)dν(a).
To prepare the proof of Theorem 4, we deﬁne the “quasi-demand” correspon-
dence D, from A × IRH+ × E to IRH+ , by
D(a, p, e) :=


{x ∈ B(a, p) | ∃x′ ∈ B(a, p), x ≺a,e x′}
if inf p · X(a) < w(a, p)
B(a, p) if inf p · X(a) = w(a, p).
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We let ∆ := {p ∈ IRH+ |
∑
h ph = 1} and we deﬁne the correspondence Γ , from
∆ × LX to ∆ × LX , by Γ (p, f) = Γ1(p, f) × Γ2(p, f), where
Γ1(p, f) := {p ∈ ∆ | (p − q) ·
∫
A
(f(a) − ω(a))dν(a) ≥ 0 ∀q ∈ ∆} ⊂ ∆
Γ2(p, f) := {g ∈ LX | g(a) ∈ coD(a, p, Φ(a, p, f)) for a.e. a ∈ A} ⊂ LX .
The next lemmas summarize the properties of the set LX and of the correspon-
dence Γ .
Lemma 1 The set LX , endowed with the weak topology of the (locally convex)
space L1(A, IRH), is nonempty, convex, compact and metrizable.
Proof. First, the set LX is nonempty, since it contains the mapping ω; indeed
ω ∈ L1(A, IRH) and, for a.e. a ∈ A, ω(a) ∈ X(a) (by C(vi)). The set LX is also
convex, since for a.e. a ∈ A, X(a) is a convex set (by C(i)).
We show now that LX is compact for the weak topology of L1(A, IRH). From
the fact that the correspondence a → X(a) is integrably bounded (by IB), one
has limν(C)→0
∫
C
f(a)dν(a) = 0 uniformly for f ∈ LX . Consequently, since
ν(A) < ∞, the set LX , which is (norm-)bounded, is also weakly sequentially
compact (see, for example, Dunford and Schwartz [8], p. 294). In view of Eberlein-
Smulian’s Theorem, this is equivalent to the fact that the weak closure of LX is
weakly compact. The proof will be complete if we show that LX is weakly closed.
But in the normed space L1(A, IRH), the convex set LX is weakly closed if and
only if it is closed in the norm topology of L1(A, IRH) (see, for example, Dunford
and Schwartz [8], p. 422). To show that LX is closed, we consider a sequence
{fn} ⊂ LX which converges to some f ∈ L1(A, IRH) for the norm topology
of L1(A, IRH), then there exists a subsequence {fnk}, which converges almost
everywhere to f . But, for a.e. a ∈ A, fnk(a) ∈ X(a), since fnk ∈ LX . Taking the
limit when k → ∞, for a.e. a ∈ A, f(a) ∈ X(a), since X(a) is a closed set (by
C(i)). This ends the proof that LX is weakly compact.
Finally, LX is metrizable (for the weak topology) since, in a separable Banach
space, the weak topology on a weakly compact set is metrizable (see, for example,
Dunford and Schwartz [8], p. 434). unionsq
Lemma 2 The correspondences Γ1 and Γ2 deﬁned on ∆ × LX with values, re-
spectively in∆ andLX , have both a closed graph and non-empty, convex, compact
values.
Proof. For the correspondence Γ1, the proof is a classical argument using Berge’s
Maximum Theorem (see Berge [5] p. 123) and proving that the function (p, f) →
p · (∫
A
f(a)dν(a) − ∫
A
ω(a)dν(a)) is continuous on ∆ × LX . Indeed, this is
clearly the case since the scalar product (of IRH ) (p, x) → p · x is continuous and
the real-valued functions (p, f) → p and (p, f) → ∫
A
f(a)dν(a) are continuous
on∆×LX , whenLX is endowed with the weak topology ofL1(A, IRH) (recalling
that LX is metrizable).
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Consider now the correspondence Γ2. It has clearly convex values and we show
hereafter that it has nonempty values. For every (p, f) ∈ ∆ × LX
{g ∈ LX | g(a) ∈ D(a, p, Φ(a, p, f)), for a.e. a ∈ A} ⊂ Γ2(p, f).
The existence of a measurable selection of the correspondence
a → D(a) := D(a, p, Φ(a, p, f)) ⊂ B(0, ρ(a))
is a consequence ofAumann’s theorem and it sufﬁces to show that (i) for a.e. a ∈ A,
D(a) = ∅ and (ii) the correspondence D(.) is measurable. The ﬁrst assertion is a
consequence of Proposition 2 of theAppendix.We now prove the second assertion.
Indeed,
GD = {(a, z) ∈ A × IRH | z ∈ D(a)}
= {(a, z) ∈ A × IRH | (a, Φ(a, p, f), z) ∈ G} = h−1(G),
where G := {(a, e, z) ∈ A × E × IRH | z ∈ D(a, p, e)} and h : A × IRH →
A×E×IRH is deﬁned by h(a, z) = (a, Φ(a, p, f), z). But the mapping h is clearly
measurable, since the mapping a → Φ(a, p, f) is measurable (by E(ii)), and G∈
A ⊗ B(E) ⊗ B(IRH), since the correspondence (a, e) → D(a, p, e) is measurable
[Proposition 2 of the Appendix]. Consequently, GD = h−1(G) ∈ A ⊗ B(IRH),
which ends the proof of Assertion (ii).
Finally, every measurable selection of the correspondence a → D(a) is inte-
grable, since from Assumption IB, for a.e. a ∈ A, D(a) ⊂ B(0, ρ(a)) for some
integrable function ρ. This shows that Γ2(p, f) is nonempty.
We now show that the correspondence Γ2 has a closed graph. Indeed (recalling
thatLX ismetrizable), let {(pn, fn, gn)} be a sequence converging to some element
(p, f, g) in ∆ × LX × LX such that gn ∈ Γ2(pn, fn) ⊂ LX for all n. Since
the sequence {gn} is integrably bounded (by IB) and converges weakly to g in
L1(A, IRH), it is a standard result (see, for example, Yannelis [19]) that
for a.e. a ∈ A, g(a) ∈ coLs{gn(a)}.
But, for a.e. a ∈ A, the correspondence (p, f) → coD(a, p, Φ(a, p, f)) has a
closed graph and convex values, since the correspondence (p, e) → D(a, p, e) has
a closed graph [Proposition 2 ofAppendix] and the mapping (p, f) → Φ(a, p, f) is
continuous on∆×LX (byE(iii), IB and the metrizability ofLX ). Hence, recalling
that, for a.e. a ∈ A, gn(a) ∈ coD(a, pn, Φ(a, pn, fn)) for all n, the closed graph
property implies
Ls{gn(a)} ⊂ coD(a, p, Φ(a, p, f)).
Consequently, for a.e. a ∈ A
g(a) ∈ coLs{gn(a)} ⊂ coD(a, p, Φ(a, p, f)),
which shows that g ∈ Γ2(p, f) and ends the proof of the lemma. unionsq
From the two above lemmas, recalling that the Cartesian product of two corre-
spondences with closed graph and non-empty, convex, compact values is a corre-
spondence with closed graph and non-empty, convex, compact values (see Berge
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[5] p. 121), the space L := IRH × L1(A, IRH), the set K := ∆ × LX and the
correspondence Γ satisfy all the assumptions of the following ﬁxed-point theorem
(see, for example, Fan [9] and Glicksberg [10]).
Theorem 5 (Fan-Glicksberg) Let K be a non-empty, convex, compact subset of
a Hausdorff locally convex space L and let Γ be a correspondence, from K to
K, with a closed graph and non-empty, convex, compact values. Then there exists
x¯ ∈ K such that x¯ ∈ Γ (x¯).
Consequently, there exists an element (p¯, f¯) ∈ ∆ × LX satisfying:
(p¯ − p) ·
∫
A
(f¯(a) − ω(a))dν(a) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ ∆, (1)
f¯(a) ∈ coD(a, p¯, Φ(a, p¯, f¯)) for a.e. a ∈ A. (2)
The following lemma shows that we can remove the convex hull in the above
assertion, by eventually modifying the function f¯ .
Lemma 3 There exists f∗ ∈ LX satisfying:
(p¯ − p) ·
∫
A
(f∗(a) − ω(a))dν(a) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ ∆, (3)
f∗(a) ∈ D(a, p¯, Φ(a, p¯, f∗)) for a.e. a ∈ A. (4)
Proof. From Assertion (2) and the fact that the correspondence a → D(a) :=
D(a, p¯, Φ(a, p¯, f¯)), from A to IRH , is measurable [Proposition 2 of theAppendix],
there exist ﬁnitely many measurable selections fi (i ∈ I) of the correspondence
a → D(a) such that, for a.e. a ∈ A, f¯(a) ∈ co{fi(a) | i ∈ I}. Indeed, consider
the correspondence F , from A to (IRH × IR)#H+1, deﬁned by
F (a) := {(fi, λi)i=1,..,#H+1 | (fi, λi) ∈ D(a) × IR+, for all i∑
i
λi = 1 and f¯(a) =
∑
i
λifi}.
Then, clearly F is measurable and nonempty valued, from Caratheodory’s the-
orem and the fact that f¯(a) ∈ coD(a). Consequently, from Aumann’s theorem,
there exists a measurable selection of the correspondence F , which deﬁnes the
measurable selections fi of the correspondence a → D(a).
FromAssumption EC, there exists a measurable set C ⊂ Ana such that:
(i) for a.e. a ∈ Ana \ C, the preference relation ≺a,Φ(a,p¯,f¯) is convex and
(ii) there exists f∗ ∈ LX such that,
for a.e. a ∈ A,Φ(a, p¯, f¯) = Φ(a, p¯, f∗)
for a.e. a ∈ C, f∗(a) ∈ {fi(a) | i ∈ I} ⊂ D(a, p¯, Φ(a, p¯, f¯))
= D(a, p¯, Φ(a, p¯, f∗)), (5)
for a.e. a ∈ A \ C, f∗(a) = f¯(a) and
∫
A
f¯(α)dν(α) =
∫
A
f∗(α)dν(α). (6)
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Since the preference relation ≺a,Φ(a,p¯,f¯) is convex for a.e. a ∈ A \C (ﬁrst, for
a.e. a ∈ A \ Ana by C(iii) and, second, for a.e. a ∈ Ana \ C by EC(i)), the set
D(a, p¯, Φ(a, p¯, f¯)) is convex. Then, from above
for a.e. a ∈ A \ C, f∗(a) = f¯(a) ∈ coD(a, p¯, Φ(a, p¯, f¯))
= D(a, p¯, Φ(a, p¯, f∗)). (7)
The Assertions (3) and (4) of the lemma follow fromAssertions (1),(6) and (5),(7)
respectively. unionsq
We come back to the proof of Theorem 4 and we show that, for p∗ = p¯,
(p∗, f∗) is a free disposal quasi-equilibrium of (E , Φ). Indeed, fromAssertion (4),
for a.e. a ∈ A, f∗(a) ∈ D(a, p∗, Φ(a, p∗, f∗)), hence the equilibrium preference
maximization condition is satisﬁed. This implies, in particular, that for a.e. a ∈ A,
f∗(a) ∈ B(a, p∗), hence p∗ · f∗(a) ≤ p∗ · ω(a). Integrating over A, one gets
p∗ · ∫
A
(f∗(a) − ω(a))dν(a) ≤ 0. Using Assertion (3), one deduces that
p ·
∫
A
(f∗(a) − ω(a))dν(a) ≤ 0 for all p ∈ ∆,
which implies the equilibrium market clearing condition∫
A
f∗(a)dν(a) ≤
∫
A
ω(a)dν(a).
4.2 Proof of Theorem 2 in the general case
4.2.1 Truncation of the economy
For each integer k > 1 and for every a ∈ A, we let
Xk(a) := {x ∈ X(a) | x ≤ k[1 · ω(a)]1}
and, for every e ∈ E, we consider the restriction of the preference relation ≺a,e on
the set Xk(a), which will be denoted identically ≺a,e in the following. We deﬁne
the truncated economy Ek, by
Ek = {IRH , E, (A,A, ν), (Xk(a), (≺a,e)e∈E , ω(a))a∈A},
where the characteristics of Ek are the same as in the economy E , but the consump-
tion sets Xk(a) and the preferences (≺a,e)e∈E of the agents, which are deﬁned
as above.
The externality mapping Φk : A× IRH ×LkX → E is deﬁned as the restriction
of Φ to A × IRH × LkX , where
LkX := {f ∈ L1(A, IRH) | f(a) ∈ Xk(a), for a.e. a ∈ A}.
It is easy to see that if (E , Φ) satisﬁes the assumption of Theorem 2, then for every k,
(Ek, Φk) satisﬁes all the assumptions ofTheorem4.Consequently, fromTheorem4,
for every k there exists a free-disposal quasi-equilibrium (pk, fk) of (Ek, Φk) with
pk > 0.
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4.2.2 For k large enough, pk >> 0
Lemma 4 There exists δ > 0 such that pk ≥ δ1 for k large enough.
Proof. Without any loss of generality, we can assume that the sequence {pk}
converges to some element p∗ in the compact set ∆. To prove the lemma it sufﬁces
to show that p∗ >> 0.
We ﬁrst show that, for a.e. a ∈ A
∃(f(a), e(a)) ∈ IRH+ × E, (p∗, f(a), e(a)) ∈ Ls{(pk, fk(a), ek(a))}. (8)
Indeed, since (pk, fk) is a free-disposal quasi-equilibrium of (Ek, Φk) for every
k, one has
for a.e. a ∈ A, 0 ≤ fk(a) and
∫
A
fk(a)dν(a) ≤
∫
A
ω(a)dν(a),
hence the sequence {∫
A
fk(a)dν(a)} is bounded in IRH and we shall deduce that
supk ‖fk‖1 < ∞. Deﬁning in IRH , ‖x‖1 =
∑
h |xh| and, recalling that, for some
m > 0, ‖x‖ ≤ m‖x‖1 for every x, we get
‖fk‖1 :=
∫
A
‖fk(a)‖dν(a) ≤ m
∫
A
∑
h∈H
fkh (a)dν(a)
= m
∥∥∥∥
∫
A
fk(a)dν(a)
∥∥∥∥
1
,
since fk(a) ≥ 0, for a.e. a ∈ A. Consequently, supk ‖fk‖1 < ∞, since the
sequence {∫
A
fk(a)dν(a)} is bounded.
Since the sequence {(pk, fk)} is (norm-)bounded in IRH × L1(A, IRH), from
Assumption EB, there exists a set N1 ∈ A with ν(N1) = 0 such that, for all
a ∈ A \ N1 the sequence {ek(a)} is bounded in E, where ek(a) := Φ(a, pk, fk).
In view of the standard version of Fatou’s lemma, one has∫
A
lim inf ‖fk(a)‖dν(a) ≤ lim inf
∫
A
‖fk(a)‖dν(a) = lim inf ‖fk‖1 < ∞,
since from above supn ‖fk‖1 < ∞. Consequently, there exists N2 ∈ A with
ν(N2) = 0 such that, for all a ∈ A \ N2, lim inf ‖fk(a)‖ < ∞, which implies
that, for all a ∈ A \N2, there exists a subsequence {kn(a)} such that the sequence
{fkn(a)(a)} is bounded in IRH+ .
Let a ∈ A \ (N1 ∪N2), noticing that the sequence {(fkn(a)(a), ekn(a)(a))} is
bounded in IRH+ ×E, without any loss of generality we can assume that the sequence
{(fkn(a)(a), ekn(a)(a))} converges to some element (f(a), e(a)) ∈ IRH+ × E.
Hence, Assertion (8) holds for all a ∈ A \ [N1 ∪ N2]. unionsq
We now come back to the proof of Lemma 4. We choose a particular
agent a0 ∈ A for whom the following properties hold: (i) the preferences of
agent a0 are continuous, (ii) the preferences of agent a0 are monotonic; (iii)
p∗ · ω(a0) > 0 and there exists a subsequence {kn}, depending on a0, such that
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(iv) (pkn , fkn(a0), ekn(a0)) → (p∗, f(a0), e(a0)), for some (f(a0), e(a0)) ∈
IRH+ × E, (v) for every n, fkn(a0) ∈ Dkn(a0, pkn , ekn(a0)) with ekn(a0) =
Φ(a0, pkn , fkn). Such an agent a0 clearly exists, since each of the aboveAssertions
(i) − (v) hold for a.e. a ∈ A; they correspond, respectively, to Assumption C(iv),
M(i), M(ii), Assertion (8) and the equilibrium preference maximization condition
for (pkn , fkn) for every n.
We will now show that p∗ >> 0. Suppose it is not true, then there exists h
such that p∗h = 0. From the above properties of agent a0, for all n, pkn · fkn(a0) ≤
pkn ·ω(a0), pkn → p∗ and fkn(a0) → f(a0), and at the limit one gets p∗ ·f(a0) ≤
p∗ ·ω(a0). Since agent a0 has monotonic preferences, there exists z = f(a0)+teh,
for some t > 0 such that f(a0) ≺a0,e(a0) z and clearly p∗ · z = p∗ · f(a0) ≤
p∗ · ω(a0). We now show that
∃ z′ ∈ IRH+ , p∗ · z′ < p∗ · ω(a0), f(a0) ≺a0,e(a0) z′. (9)
Indeed, if p∗ · z < p∗ · ω(a0), we take z′ = z. If p∗ · z = p∗ · ω(a0) > 0, we
can choose i ∈ H such that p∗i > 0 and zi > 0. Since agent a0 has continuous
preferences, there exists ε > 0 such that z′ = z−εei ∈ IRH+ and f(a0) ≺a0,e(a0) z′.
We have also p∗ ·z′ = p∗ ·z−εp∗i < p∗ ·ω(a0). This ends the proof ofAssertion (9).
We end the proof by contradicting the fact that fkn(a0) belongs to
Dk(a0, pkn , ekn(a0)). Indeed, from p∗ ·ω(a0) > 0 (by (iii)) andAssertion (9), re-
calling that the sequence{(pkn , fkn(a0), ekn(a0))} converges to (p∗, f(a0), e(a0))
(by (iv)) and using the continuity of preferences of agent a0, for n large enough, we
get pkn · ω(a0) > 0, z′ ∈ IRH+ , pkn · z′ ≤ pkn · ω(a0) and xkn(a0) ≺a0,ekn (a0) z′.
Moreover, we can also assume that z′ ∈ Xkn(a0). All together, these conditions
contradict the fact that fkn(a0) ∈ Dk(a0, pkn , ekn(a0)) and this ends the proof of
the lemma. unionsq
4.2.3 For k large enough, (pk, fk) is an equilibrium for (E , Φ)
It is a consequence of the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For every k large enough and for a.e. a ∈ A, one has:
(i) B(a, pk) ⊂ Xk(a);
(ii) fk(a) is a maximal element in B(a, pk) for ≺a,ek(a),
where ek(a) = Φ(a, pk, fk);
(iii) pk · fk(a) = pk · ω(a);
(iv)
∫
A
fk(a)dν(a) =
∫
A
ω(a)dν(a).
Proof. From Lemma 4, there exists K such that, for every k ≥ K
pkh > δ for each h ∈ H and
1
δ
≤ k.
In the following we ﬁx k ≥ K.
(i) For a.e. a ∈ A, let x ∈ B(a, pk), i.e., x ∈ IRH+ and pk · x ≤ pk · ω(a). From
above, recalling that pk ∈ ∆, one gets
δxh ≤ pkhxh ≤ pk · x ≤ pk · ω(a) ≤
∑
h
ωh(a) = 1 · ω(a),
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which implies that
0 ≤ x ≤ 1
δ
[1 · ω(a)]1 ≤ k[1 · ω(a)]1
or equivalently x ∈ Xk(a).
(ii) For a.e. a ∈ A such that pk ·ω(a) > 0, fk(a) is a maximal element inB(a, pk)
for ≺a,ek(a), since B(a, pk) ⊂ Xk(a) (by Part (i)) and the fact that (pk, fk) is a
free-disposal quasi-equilibrium for (Ek, Φk). For a.e. a ∈ A such that pk ·ω(a) = 0,
recalling that pk >> 0 (by Lemma 4), we getB(a, pk) = {0} and the result follows
from the Irreﬂexivity Assumption C(ii).
(iii) The result is obvious for a.e. a ∈ A such that pk ·ω(a) = 0. Assume now that
pk · ω(a) > 0. From the Monotonicity Assumption M(i), there exists a sequence
{fn(a)} ⊂ IRH+ such that fn(a) → fk(a) and fk(a) ≺a,ek(a) fn(a). From Part
(ii), fk(a) is amaximal element of≺a,ek(a) inB(a, pk), consequently pk ·fn(a) >
pk ·ω(a). Passing to the limit one gets pk · fk(a) ≥ pk ·ω(a), which together with
fk(a) ∈ B(a, pk) implies that pk · fk(a) = pk · ω(a).
(iv) Integrating over A the equalities of Part (iii), one gets
pk ·
(∫
A
fk(a)dν(a) −
∫
A
ω(a)dν(a)
)
= 0.
Since (pk, fk) is a free-disposal quasi-equilibrium for (Ek, Φk), one has∫
A
fk(a)dν(a) ≤
∫
A
ω(a)dν(a)
and, recalling that pk >> 0 (by Lemma 4), we get∫
A
fk(a)dν(a) =
∫
A
ω(a)dν(a).
5 Appendix
5.1 Properties of the quasi-demand correspondence
Let (A,A, ν) be a measure space of consumers, and assume that each consumer
a is endowed with a consumption set X(a) ⊂ IRH , a preference relation ≺a,e on
X(a) (for each externality e ∈ E) and a wealth mapping w : A× IRH → IR. In the
following, we let
P := {p ∈ IRH | inf p · X(a) ≤ w(a, p) for a.e. a ∈ A},
B(a, p) := {x ∈ X(a) | p · x ≤ w(a, p)},
D(a, p, e) :=


{x ∈ B(a, p) | ∃x′ ∈ B(a, p), x ≺a,e x′}
if inf p · X(a) < w(a, p)
B(a, p) if inf p · X(a) = w(a, p).
The properties of the quasi-demand correspondence D are summarized in the
following proposition, which extends standard results (see, for example, Hilden-
brand [12]) in the no-externality case (say E = {0}).
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Proposition 2 Let {(A,A, ν), E, (X(a), (≺a,e)e∈E , )a∈A, w} satisfy Assump-
tions A, C and IB and assume that the wealth distribution w : A × IRH → IR
is a Caratheodory function8. Then:
(i) for every p ∈ P the correspondence (a, e) → D(a, p, e), from A × E to IRH ,
is measurable;
(ii) for a.e. a ∈ A the correspondence (p, e) → D(a, p, e), from P × E to IRH ,
has a closed graph and nonempty, compact values.
Proof. In the following, for a.e. a ∈ A and for every p ∈ P , we let
Pa := {p ∈ P | inf p · X(a) < w(a, p)},
Ap := {a ∈ A | inf p · X(a) < w(a, p)}.
Proof of (i). Let p ∈ P , we prove that
G := {(a, e, d) ∈ A × E × IRH | d ∈ D(a, p, e)} ∈ A ⊗ B(E) ⊗ B(IRH)
and we ﬁrst notice that G = G1 ∪ G2, where
G1 := {(a, e, d) ∈ (A \ Ap) × E × IRH | d ∈ X(a), p · d ≤ w(a, p)},
G2 := {(a, e, d) ∈ Ap × E × IRH | d ∈ D(a, p, e)}.
Wenotice thatG1 ∈ A⊗B(E)⊗B(IRH), since themapping (a, d) → p·d−w(a, p)
and the correspondence a → X(a) are measurable and Ap ∈ A.
To show that G2 ∈ A ⊗ B(E) ⊗ B(IRH), we apply the argument used by
Hildenbrand [12]. Since the correspondenceB(., p), fromAp to IRH , has nonempty
values and is measurable, there exists a sequence of measurable mappings {fn},
from Ap to IRH , such that for a.e. a ∈ Ap, {fn(a)} is dense in B(a, p) (see, for
example, [6]). We now deﬁne the correspondences ξn, from Ap × E to IRH , by
ξn(a, e) = {x ∈ B(a, p) | not[x ≺a,e fn(a)]}
and we claim that: D(a, p, e) = ∩∞n=1ξn(a, e), for a.e. a ∈ Ap .
Clearly, for every n, D(a, p, e) ⊂ ξn(a, e). Conversely, let x ∈ ∩∞n=1ξn(a, e)
and suppose that x /∈ D(a, p, e). Then, the set U = {x′ ∈ B(a, p) | x ≺a,e x′} is
nonempty and is open relative toB(a, p) (by C(iv)). Since the sequence {fn(a)} is
dense in B(a, p), we deduce that for some n0, x ≺a,e fn0(a), but this contradicts
the fact that x ∈ ξn0(a, e). Thus, we have
G2 = {(a, e, d) ∈ Ap × E × IRH | d ∈ D(a, p, e)}
= ∩∞n=1{(a, e, d) ∈ Ap × E × IRH | d ∈ ξn(a, e)}.
Hence, the set G2 is measurable, since ≺a,e is measurable (by C(v)), the mappings
fn and the correspondence a → B(a, p) are measurable and recalling thatAp ∈ A.
8 That is, for every p ∈ IRH , the function a → w(a, p) is measurable and, for a.e. a ∈ A, the
function p → w(a, p) is continuous. We note that the wealth distribution considered in our model
w(a, p) := p · ω(a) satisﬁes this property, when ω is assume to be measurable.
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Proof of (ii). We ﬁrst show that D(a, p, e) = ∅ for a.e. a ∈ A and every (p, e) ∈
P ×E. For a.e. a ∈ A\Ap,D(a, p, e) = B(a, p) = ∅ since inf p ·X(a) ≤ w(a, p).
We now consider a ∈ Ap and we simply denote B := B(a, p), which is clearly a
nonempty, compact set (by IB).We suppose, by contraposition, thatD(a, p, e) = ∅,
that is, for every x ∈ B, there exists x′ ∈ B, x ≺a,e x′. Then B = ∪x′∈BVx′ ,
where Vx′ = {x ∈ B | x ≺a,e x′} is open in B (by C(iv)). Since B is compact,
there exists a ﬁnite subset {x′i | i ∈ N} ⊂ B such that B = ∪i∈NVx′i . We now
claim that there exists i ∈ N such that not [x′i ≺a,e x′j] for every j ∈ N . Indeed,
if such a maximal element does not exist, for every i ∈ N , there exists σ(i) ∈ N
such that x′i ≺a,e x′σ(i). The mappings σ : N → N clearly admits a cycle, that is,
for some i and some integer k one has i = σk(i) (the composition of σ with itself
k times). The transitivity (by C(ii)) of ≺a,e implies that x′i ≺a,e x′σk(i) = x′i which
contradicts the irreﬂexivity (by C(ii)) of ≺a,e. We end the proof by considering
such a maximal element x′i ∈ B, which belongs to some set Vx′j (j ∈ N), that is,
x′i ≺a,e x′j for some j ∈ J . But this is in contradiction with the maximality of x′i.
This ends the proof that D(a, p, e) is nonempty.
We now show that, for a.e. a ∈ A, the correspondence (p, e) → D(a, p, e), from
P ×E to IRH , has a closed graph. Let (pn, en, xn) → (p, e, x) inP ×E× IRH such
that, for all n, xn ∈ D(a, pn, en). From pn ·xn ≤ w(a, pn), passing to the limit and
recalling that the mappingw(a, .) is continuous, one gets p ·x ≤ w(a, p). Recalling
that X(a) is closed, we get that x ∈ B(a, p). Thus, if inf p · X(a) = w(a, p), we
have x ∈ D(a, p, e) = B(a, p). We assume now that inf p · X(a) < w(a, p).
Since pn → p, for n large enough, w(a, pn) > inf pn · X(a). Suppose now that
x ∈ D(a, p, e). This implies that there exists x′ ∈ B(a, p) such that x ≺a,e x′.
From the fact thatw(a, p) > inf p ·X(a) and the ContinuityAssumption C(iv), we
can ﬁnd x′′ ∈ X(a) such that x ≺a,e x′′ and p ·x′′ < w(a, p). Since pn → p, for n
large enough, pn · x′′ < w(a, pn). Since en → e, from the Continuity Assumption
C(iv), for n large enough, xn ≺a,en x′′. Consequently, we can choose n (large
enough) such that w(a, pn) > inf pn ·X(a), x′′ ∈ B(a, pn) and xn ≺a,en x′′, but
this contradicts the fact that xn ∈ D(a, pn, en). unionsq
5.2 Properties of Noguchi’s reference coalitions
In this section, we end the proof of Corollary 1 (of Sect. 3.3) and it only remains
to show that the reference coalitions, deﬁned by
C(a, p) = {α ∈ A | p · ω(α) ∈ I(ω(a), δ(a), p)}
satisfy Assumption R of Theorem 3.
Proof. R(i) is a consequence ofN(ii) sinceCN (a, p) ⊂ C(a, p) andR(ii) is a direct
consequence of N(iv). unionsq
Proof of R(iii). Let (a, p) ∈ A × IRH+ , we deﬁne
W (a, p) := {ω′ ∈ IRH+ | p · ω′ ∈ I(ω(a), δ(a), p)}.
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Clearly, one has
W (a, p) \ W (a, p) ⊂ {ω′ ∈ IRH+ | p · ω′ ∈ I(ω(a), δ(a), p) \ I(ω(a), δ(a), p)}
ω−1(W (a, p) \ W (a, p)) ⊂ ∪
c∈I(ω(a),δ(a),p)\I(ω(a),δ(a),p){α∈A | p·ω(α)=c}
and using Assumption N(ix), one gets
ν[ω−1(W (a, p) \ W (a, p))] = 0.
Since the measure τ := νoω−1 is a ﬁnite Borel measure on IRH+ , from
Noguchi [15] (see Lemma 2), for every sequence {pn} ⊂ IRH+ converging to p,
one has
τ(W (a, pn)∆W (a, p)) := ν[ω−1(W (a, pn)∆W (a, p))] → 0.
Noticing that CN (a, pn) = ω−1(W (a, pn)) and CN (a, p) = ω−1(W (a, p)),
one gets
ν[CN (a, pn)∆CN (a, p)] = ν[ω−1(W (a, pn))∆ω−1(W (a, p))]
= ν[ω−1(W (a, pn)∆W (a, p))] → 0.
Recalling now that ν[C(a, p)/CN (a, p)] = 0 for every (a, p) ∈ A × IRH+ , from
above, we get ν[C(a, pn)∆C(a, p)] → 0 when pn → p in IRH+ . unionsq
Proof of R(iv). It is a consequence of the following lemma, deﬁning, for a ﬁxed
p ∈ IRH+ , the mappings f : A → (IRH+ )2, g : A → IRH+ and the correspondence
F , from (IRH+ )2 to IR, by f(a) = (ω(a), δ(a)), g(α) = p · ω(α) and F (ω, δ) =
I(ω, δ, p) and noticing that
C(a, p) = {α ∈ A | g(α) ∈ F (f(a))}
and that, Condition N implies that f, g and F satisfy the assumption of the lemma.
(We only notice that, N(vii) implies that for every t ∈ IRH+ , the set F−1(t) :=
{(ω, δ) ∈ (IRH+ )2 | t ∈ I(ω, δ, p)} is open, hence measurable.)
Lemma 6 Let f : A → IRm, g : A → IRn be two measurable mappings and let
F be a correspondence, from IRm to IRn, such that, for every (x, t) ∈ ×IRm × IRn,
F (x) is open and F−1(t) is measurable. Then the set
G := {(a, α) ∈ A × A | g(α) ∈ F (f(a))}
is measurable.
Proof. Note that (a, α) ∈ G if and only if
∀k ∈ IN, B
(
g(α),
1
k
)
∩ F (f(a)) = ∅
and, using the fact that F (f(a)) is an open set, if and only if
∀k ∈ IN, ∃tk ∈ Qn, ‖tk − g(α)‖ < 1
k
and tk ∈ F (f(a)).
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Consequently
G = ∩k ∪t∈Qn
[
A×
{
α∈A | ‖t−g(α)‖ < 1
k
}
∩{a∈A | t∈F (f(a))}×A
]
,
which is measurable since the set {α ∈ A | ‖t− g(α)‖ < 1k} is measurable (since
the mapping g is measurable) and the set {a ∈ A | t ∈ F (f(a))} is measurable
(since the set F−1(t) is measurable and the mapping f is measurable). unionsq
5.3 Balder’s counterexample of nonexistence of equilibria
Theorem 4 may not hold if we remove the Convexity Assumption EC.
We consider the following example, due to Balder [4], of an economy E with
a single commodity, A = [0, 1] endowed with the Lebesgue measure ν and the
Lebesgue σ−algebra (i.e. the completion of the Borel σ−algebra). For each agent
a ∈ [0, 1], the consumption set and the initial endowment are given by X(a) =
[0, 2] and ω(a) = 2; the preference relation ≺a,e is deﬁned by the utility function
ua,e(x) := |x + e|. The simplex of prices for this economy is ∆ = {1}, the
externality space is R and the externality mapping Φ : A × ∆ × LX → IR is
deﬁned by
Φ(a, 1, f) := a − 1 −
∫ a
0
f(α)dν(α).
It is easy to check that this economy satisﬁes all the assumptions of Theorem 4, but
the convexity assumption EC (i.e., it satisﬁes Assumptions A, C, E and IB).
FromBalder [4], this economy does not admit a free disposal quasi-equilibrium.
For the sake of completeness the argument goes as follows. Assume that E admits
such an equilibrium, denoted (f∗, 1). For a.e. a ∈ A, we have B(a, 1) = [0, 2],
and from the equilibrium consumer condition we deduce that f∗(a) = 0 if∫ a
0 f
∗(α)dν(α) > a and f∗(a) = 2 if
∫ a
0 f
∗(α)dν(α) < a. We now con-
sider the absolutely continuous function Ψ : A → IR+ deﬁned by Ψ(a) :=
[
∫ a
0 (f
∗(α) − 1)dν(α)]2. From above, we deduce that
Ψ ′(a) = 2(f∗(a) − 1)
∫ a
0
(f∗(α) − 1)dν(α) ≤ 0 for a.e. a ∈ A.
Hence, for every a ∈ A Ψ(a) ≤ Ψ(0) = 0, which together with 0 ≤ Ψ(a), implies
that
∫ a
0 (f
∗(α)−1)dν(α) = 0. Consequently, f∗ = 1, which contradicts the above
assertion that f∗(a) ∈ {0, 2} for a.e. a ∈ A.
Finally, we show that the Convexity Assumption EC does not hold. Indeed,
assume that EC holds. We ﬁrst notice that for every a ∈ A, for e = −1 (which is
for example obtained by Φ with f = 1) and for x = 12 , the set
{x′ ∈ [0, 2] | not[x′ ≺a,e x]} =
[
0,
1
2
]
∪
[
3
2
, 2
]
,
is not convex. Consequently, by Assumption EC, the externality mapping Φ must
be convex on A (in the sense of Deﬁnition 2). So, let {fi}i=1,2 deﬁned by f1 = 0
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and f2 = 2, then the function f = 1 satisﬁes f(α) ∈ co{f1(α), f2(α)} for a.e.
α ∈ A. Since Φ is convex on A, there exists f∗ ∈ LX such that, for a.e. α ∈ A,
f∗(α) ∈ {f1(α), f2(α)} and Φ(a, 1, f∗) = Φ(a, 1, f). From this last relation one
gets that
∫ a
0 f
∗(α)dν(α) =
∫ a
0 f(α)dν(α) for a.e. a ∈ A, which implies that
f∗(α) − f(α) = 0 for a.e. α ∈ A. So, f∗ = f = 1, which contradicts the above
assertion that f∗(α) ∈ {0, 2} for a.e. α ∈ A.
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